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IS A DELAYED RESULT A JUST RESULT? THE USE
OF LACHES AS AN EQUITABLE DEFENSE TO
REMEDIAL BACK PAY UNDER THE EEOC’S
SOVEREIGNTY
Ruth Ann Mueller
Unlike private litigants, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) does not face a statute of limitations when litigating claims for alleged
Title VII violations. 1 Instead, the EEOC can file suit against an employer, and
recover for both an individual’s private claim and the broader public interest
affected by the individual’s claim, many years after the alleged discrimination
occurred. 2 This freedom causes practical implications for employers, such as
record retention issues, impaired memory of employees, and witness
unavailability. 3
These factors greatly lengthen the amount of time between
filing the claim and case dismissal, which can increase the amount of back pay
to be pursued against an employer. 4 Without a firm time bar, employers tend to
resort to the time-honored equitable defense of laches. 5 This Note explores
whether an employer may raise this defense as a matter of law and overcome the
presumption that laches cannot be used against the arm of the sovereign,
specifically when the EEOC pursues back pay as a remedy. 6
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by the Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 (“Title VII” or “Act”), prohibits an employer from
discriminating based on race, sex, national origin, or religion. 7 In 1972,
 J.D., T he Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2018; B.A., T he College of
William & Mary, 2012. T he author would like to thank Laura Offenbacher Aradi for sharing her
invaluable guidance, expertise, and time, the Catholic University Law Review Vol. 67 and 68
editors and staff members for their assistance in editing and publishing this Note, and her parents
for their unconditional support.
1. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012) (exhibiting that the plain language of the statute
does not contain a statute of limitations); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 360
(1977).
2. See Mary Lynn Kelly, Preventing Trial by Ambush: The Laches Defense in Title VII Suits,
8 REV. LITIG . 227, 228 (1989).
3. E.g., EEOC v. SWMW Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543, at
*10 (D. Ariz. April 22, 2009).
4. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 230–31.
5. E.g., SWMW Mgmt., 2009 WL 1097543, at *15–16 n.2.
6. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 233–34.
7. T itle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e–2000e-17 (2012).
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to [1] fail or refuse to hire
or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or [2] to limit, segregate,

787

788

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 67:605

Congress delegated enforcement authority to the EEOC. 8 This delegation did
not include a definitive statute of limitations for the EEOC to initiate claims
against a private employer. 9 Congress remedied the recovery issue by amending
the statute in 1991 to include recovery by a complaining party, which includes
both private employees and the EEOC, for compensatory and punitive
damages. 10
Because federal agencies face large caseloads with limited resources and the
types of cases presented under the Act require meticulous review of an
employer’s practices, as well as an investigation of employee and witnessemployee testimony, alleged unreasonable delay often occurs between a
discrimination cause of action and the EEOC filing suit. 11 The EEOC protects
the overall societal right to freedom from discrimination, and may be exempt
from facing the laches defense under sovereign immunity. 12 Despite this, some
courts have allowed the use of laches against the EEOC by reviewing the facts

or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive
or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
§ 2000e-2(a).
8. Wesley Kobylak, Laches or Other Assertion of Untimeliness As Defense To Action Under
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.) brou ght by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 67 A.L.R. Fed. 381, § 2[a] (1984).
9. Id. § 3[a]. Having a statute of limitations creates a stable and clear understanding of the
deadline for when a suit must be filed. See T andy Corp. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 769 F.2d 362,
365 (6th Cir. 1985).
10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(a)(1), (d)(1)(A). “ [T ]hese statutes unambiguously authorize the
EEOC to obtain the relief that it seeks in its complaint if it can prove its case against [the]
respondent.” EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 287 (2002). T here are limits on
compensatory and punitive damages depending on the size of the employer:
Compensatory damages pay victims for out -of-pocket expenses caused by the
discrimination (such as costs associated with a job search or medical expenses) and
compensate them for any emotional harm suffered (such as mental anguish,
inconvenience, or loss of enjoyment of life). Punitive damages may be awarded to punish
an employer who has committed an especially malicious or reckless act of discrimination.
. . . For employers with 15-100 employees, the limit is $50,000. For employers with 101200 employees, the limit is $100,000. For employers with 201 -500 employees, the limit
is $200,000. For employers with more than 500 emp loyees, the limit is $300,000.
Remedies for Employment Discrimination, U.S. EQUAL EMP ’ T OP P ORTUNITY COMM’ N ,
https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/remedies.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
11. E.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961); EEOC v. Marquez Bros. Int’l,
Inc., No. 1:17-CV-44 AWI-EPG, 2018 WL 3197796, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. June 26, 2018). The
website for the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission lists the general time
requirements for filing discrimination actions. See generally Time Limits For Filing A Charge,
U.S. EQUAL EMP ’ T OP P ORTUNITY COMM’ N , https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/timeliness.cfm (last
visited Mar. 15, 2018).
12. See Kobylak, supra note 8, § 2[a], § 3[d].
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through the lens of a private individual’s cause of action against a defendant
employer. 13
The use of laches in the United States has roots in the courts of equity in
England, where a defendant could assert an affirmative defense against a dated
claim. 14 It is traditionally established by a two-prong test: unreasonable delay
and material prejudice to the defendant. 15 Although the defense of laches is
predominately utilized in private, equitable suits, there is less certainty in its use
against the federal agencies in the United States. 16 Case law generally follows
the English proposition that laches cannot be used against the king (or
sovereign). 17 Alternatively, some courts have interpreted the availability of the
use of laches against the United States government and administrative agencies

13. Id. § 3[c].
14. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 6 (2018); see generally 30A C.J.S Equity § 4 (2018) (“ [W]hen a court
exercises its equity powers . . . a court ’s duty is to do complete justice between the parties to the
action.”). T he equitable courts within the United States are “ remedial,” not “ inquisitorial.” Id.
T herefore, their purpose is not to create a cause of action. Id. “ A court of equity moves upon [the]
considerations of conscience, good faith, and reasonable diligence.” Whittington v. Dragon Grp.,
LLC, 991 A.2d 1, 8 (Del. 2009) (quoting Reid v. Spazio, 970 A.2d 176, 183 (Del. 2009)).
15. See Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3[a].
16. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 147 (2018).
T hus, in the context of a defense based on laches, delay is not a bar unless it works to the
disadvantage or prejudice of other parties. Where no one has been harmed in any legal
sense and the situation has not materially changed, the delay is not fatal. T hus, even
where impermissible delay is present under the circumstances presented, if the delay has
not prejudiced the party asserting the laches defense, it will not bar the equitable action.
Furthermore, a party cannot assert the defense of laches if h e or she actually benefited
from the delay.
Id. (citations omitted).
17. Charles Alan Wright et al., Litigation Advantages of the United States, 14 FED . P RAC. &
P ROC. JURIS. § 3652 (4th ed. 2017).
T he rule quod nullum tempus occurrit regi—that the sovereign is exempt from the
consequences of its laches, and from the operation of statutes of limitations—appears to
be a vestigial survival of the prerogative of the Crown . . . . But whether or not that alone
accounts for its origin, the source of its continuing vitality where the royal privilege no
longer exists is to be found in the public policy now underlying the rule even though it
may in the beginning have had a different policy basis . . . . “ T he true reason . . . is to be
found in the great public policy of preserving the public rights, revenues, and property
from injury and loss, by the negligence of public officers. And though this is sometimes
called a prerogative right, it is in fact nothing more than a reservation, or exception,
introduced for the public benefit, and equally applicable to all governments.” Story, J.,
in United States v. Hoar, C.C.D.Mass.1821, 26 Fed.Cas. p. 329, 330 , No. 15373.
Regardless of the form of government and independently of the royal prerogative once
thought sufficient to justify it, the rule is supportable now because its benefit and
advantage extend to every citizen, including the defendant, whose plea of laches or
limitation it precludes; and its uniform survival in the United States has been generally
accounted for and justified on grounds of policy rather than upon any inherited notions
of the personal privilege of the king.
Id.
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based on the EEOC’s protection of private rights. 18 The question is whether the
EEOC acts in the place of the private individual when litigating on his or her
behalf, or in the position of the U.S. government as the sovereign who carries
enforcement authority. The issue of back pay for an employee continues to fall
between the line of a private individual’s right and the collective rights of
workers protected by the EEOC.
This Note will first discuss the process an individual follows when filing a
complaint with the EEOC and how many procedural deadlines do not affect the
EEOC’s right to sue an employer. Part II discusses the general use of laches
against the United States government and how its adoption from English
common law occurred. Part III discusses the significance and timeliness that the
availability of laches has upon the relationship between the EEOC, private
employees, and private employers. Part IV analyzes how courts determine the
availability of laches, which scenarios give cause to assert laches against the
EEOC, and how an inadequate employer defense could increase back pay
liability.
I.

HOW

AN EMPLOYEE ’ S PRIVAT E

T IT LE VII CHARGE BECOMES
ISSUE

A PUBLIC

Although the statute does not provide for a specific limitation period for the
EEOC to file suit against an employer, private litigants must comply with
specific deadlines as a condition to bringing suit under the Act. 19 An aggrieved
employee must file a charge with the EEOC within 180 days from the day that
discrimination took place. 20 The EEOC then serves notice upon the employer
within ten days of the employee’s charge. 21 This is merely a deadline to provide
notice of the charge and is not a bar against the EEOC from filing a subsequent
lawsuit. 22

18. See generally Martin v. Consultants & Adm’rs, Inc., 966 F.2d 1078, 1100–01 (7th Cir.
1992) (Posner, J., concurring); Wright et al., supra note 17 (“ Some lower courts have questioned
whether the Government ’s immunity from the defense of laches should be confined to core
sovereign functions, and not extended to suits involving the enforcement of federal programs that
involve commercial matters, such as loans and mortgages.”). But see Guar. T rust Co. v. United
States, 304 U.S. 126, 132–33 (1938).
[T ]he rule . . . that the sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches, and from
the operation of [federal] statutes of limitations [survives on the ground of public policy
rather than of royal prerogative and is] deemed an exception to local statutes of
limitations where the government . . . is not expressly included . . . .
Id.
19. See Time Limits for Filing a Charge, supra note 11.
20. Id.
21. What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed , U.S. EQUAL EMP ’ T OP P ORTUNITY
COMM’ N , https://www.eeoc.gov/employers/process.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2018).
22. Id.
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The EEOC may conduct an investigation to determine if “reasonable cause
[exists] to believe that the [employee’s] charge is true . . . .” 23 This decision
occurs no later than 120 days from filing the charge. 24 If, after this initial
investigation, the EEOC determines that reasonable cause does not exist, the
EEOC will issue an administrative dismissal. 25 A notice of administrative
dismissal is sent to both the employer and employee; a right-to-sue letter for
administrative dismissals accompanies an employee’s dismissal notice. 26 If
reasonable cause exists, the EEOC will pursue “informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion” before filing a lawsuit. 27 Essentially, the EEOC
must give the employer the opportunity to reach a resolution with the agency
before resorting to the courts. 28 If conciliation does not occur, the EEOC can
bring forth a lawsuit anytime “thirty days after the filing of the charge.” 29 If a
party’s charge is not dismissed, settled, or litigated by the EEOC within 180 days
after the initial charge filing, the employee may pursue a private action. 30
Therefore, a private litigant does not lose the ability to file a lawsuit despite a
failed conciliation or time period expiration. 31
The EEOC’s ability to sue an employer for Title VII claims rests within its
sovereign power as a federal agency, and is not based upon whether a private
litigant initiates a complaint. 32
Although an employer can use the
aforementioned deadlines and procedures as a guideline to potential scenarios
when defending Title VII lawsuits, the EEOC, in the position of the sovereign,
retains the right to sue an employer at any time. 33

23. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2012); see Kelly, supra note 2, at 229 (quoting § 2000e-5(b)).
24. See Elinor A. Swanson, A Textualist Approach to Title VII: Aggrieved Individuals May
Bypass The EEOC, 32 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP . L.J. 345, 352 (2015); Kelly, supra note 2, at 229.
25. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.017(a)(1) (2016). An agency must dism iss a claim that: fails to state
a claim under 29 CFR § 1614.03 or 29 CFR § 1614.106(a), or “ states the same claim that is pending
before or has been decided by the agency or the Commission.” Id. Preserving Access to the Legal
System: Common Errors By Federal Agencies In Dismissing Complaints of Discrimination on
Procedural Grounds, EEOC 4–5 (Sept. 15, 2014), https://www.eeoc.gov/federal/reports/dismi
ssals.cfm#II.
26. What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed, supra note 21.
27. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 229–30; see What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed,
supra note 21.
28. What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed, supra note 21.
29. Kelly, supra note 2, at 229.
30. Id. at 229–30.
31. Id.
32. See What You Can Expect After a Charge is Filed, supra note 21.
33. See Filing a Lawsuit, U.S. EQUAL EMP ’ T OP P ORTUNITY COMM’ N , https://www.eeoc.g
ov/employees/lawsuit.cfm (last visited Mar. 15, 2018) (explaining that the EEOC enjoys the
discretion as to if and when to bring a lawsuit).
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II. DISAGREEMENT OVER SOVEREIGN CAPACIT Y LEADS T O UNCERT AINT Y
OVER LACHES USE
A. Adoption of Laches and Its Two Prongs Within United States Courts
The rule that the king is not bound by a statute of limitations extends from the
English common law relationship between the sovereign and the public. 34 In
adopting this ideal, the United States Supreme Court found that “[i]t was deemed
important that, while the sovereign was engrossed by the cares and duties of his
office, the public should not suffer by the negligence of his servants.” 35 Courts
have steadfastly adopted this rule in the United States, adhering to the idea that
the sovereign “cannot be expected to look over each individual citizen because
his duty is to the population as a whole,” and “the [sovereign] should not be
penalized for the negligence of his officers.”36 Courts have found it to be good
policy in restricting use of laches against the government because the sovereign
protects the public good. 37 In the past thirty years, courts have loosened this rule
in varying situations. 38 Judicial leaders, such as Judge Richard Posner, have
stated, “[G]overnment suits in equity are subject to the principles of equity,
laches is generally and we think correctly assumed to be applicable to suits by
government agencies as well as by private parties.”39
Under United States law, the party who asserts the affirmative defense of
laches carries the burden of proof with respect to unreasonable delay and
material prejudice to the employer. 40 Unreasonable delay begins when a party
knows (or should have known) about the defendant’s actions and continues until
the plaintiff actually files suit against the defendant. 41 Prejudice is never
34. Guar. T r. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938) (“ But whether or not that alone
accounts for its origin, the source of its continuing vitality where the royal privilege no longer exists
is to be found in the public policy now underlying the rule even though it may in the beginning
have had a different policy basis.”).
35. United States v. T hompson, 98 U.S. 486, 489 (1879).
36. An Nguyen, Note, It’s About Time: Reconsidering Whether Laches Should Lie Against
the Government, 2015 U. I LL . L. REV. 2111, 2128 (2015).
37. Id. at 2129.
38. United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1995). In this case, the
Seventh Circuit advised that laches may be used against the government in “ suits against the
government in which . . . there is no statute of limitations” or the government ’s enforcement of
“ what are the nature of private rights . . . .” Id.
39. NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, 894 F.2d 887, 894 (1990).
40. See Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3[a].
41. Id.; see HENRY T HOMAS BANNING , T HE LAW OF THE LIMITATIONS OF ACTIONS:
T OGETHER W ITH SOME OBSERVATIONS ON T HE EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF LACHES (OR DELAY)
AND ACQUIESCENCE 229 (3d ed. 1906) (“ It is an accepted maxim of equity, that delay defeats
equitable rights (5); and even a comparatively short delay, wh ich is not satisfactory accounted for,
tells heavily against a plaintiff . . . .”).
T here is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches, and each case must be determined
according to its own particular circumstances. In other words, the question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court. Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its
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assumed, and the party who asserts the defense carries the burden of proof with
respect to these two prongs. 42 Ultimately, “[t]he mere passage of time will not
give rise to an inference of prejudice . . .” because there must be a “resultant
injury or prejudice by reason of the delay, or a change in the condition of the
property or relations of the parties rendering it . . . .” 43
B. The Beginning of Judicial Sidestepping Around Laches Use
The United States affirmatively considered the use of laches against the
sovereign in Costello v. United States. 44 Frank Costello, an illegal bootlegger,
applied for citizenship in 1925. 45 Costello fraudulently indicated that he worked
in real estate both on his naturalization application and to his naturalization
examiner. 46 Costello admitted to a government agent in 1938 that he engaged
in illegal bootlegging between 1923 and 1931. 47 Costello admitted his
involvement in the conspiracy on two separate occasions before a grand jury in
1939 and again in 1943. 48 The United States filed suit against Costello in 1952,
and subsequently revoked his citizenship in 1959. 49

application is controlled by equitable considerations. Laches cannot be invoked to defeat
justice, and it will be applied where, and only where, the enforcement of the right asserted
would work injustice.
30A C.J.S Equity § 142 (2018).
42. 30A C.J.S. Equity § 147 (2018).
43. Id.; Guar. T r. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132 (1938); see Irwin v. Dep’t of Veteran
Affairs, 489 U.S. 89, 98 (1990) (“ Not only is the Court’s holding inconsistent with our traditional
approach to cases involving sovereign immunity, it directly overrules a prior decision by this
court.”). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND ) OF JUDGMENTS § 74 (1982).
T he relevant factors in denying relief to which an applicant is prima facie entitled include
undue delay, possible prejudice to the winner of the judgment, and protection of interests
of innocent third persons. Undue delay and prejudice to the judgment winner merge into
each other. While delay in assertion of a claim does not as such produce adverse
consequences, it can induce a sense of repose that itself may become a protectable
interest. Correlatively, the likelihood and extent of reliance on a judgment, or of change
in conditions, increases as time passes after the judgment ’s rendition.
Id. See generally BANNING , supra note 41, at 231–232.
“ Standing by” is a specific laches,—although it is, more usually, a species of
acquiescence: And the effect of it, where the position of the defendant has been materially
altered as a consequence of it, will be to prevent the plaintiff’s equitable right from being
enforceable . . . In every case, it must be remembered, that the fraudulent conduct
continues valid until the plaintiff has elected to avoid it . . . .
Id.
44. 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961); see also Kelly, supra note 2, at 235.
45. Costello, 365 U.S. at 267.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 273.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 266.
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Costello argued that the twenty-seven year delay between his filing for
citizenship and the government’s suit against him prejudiced his defense. 50
Whether or not undue delay occurred in the proceeding, the Court held that
Costello did not experience prejudice due to the delay. 51 Rather, the Court
decided that any probable prejudice would burden the government rather than
Costello by bringing the suit twenty-seven years later and thus, diminishing the
memories of the United States’ witnesses. 52
Ultimately, the Court rejected Costello’s use of laches. 53 Despite a
willingness to open the door to Costello’s laches defense, the Court did not
affirmatively decide whether laches could be used against the government since
Costello could not satisfy laches’ two-prong requirements. 54
C. The Use of Laches Against the EEOC’s Right to Litigate on Behalf of the
Public Interest in EEOC-Initiated Cases
The guiding case with respect to laches and EEOC-initiated cases is
Occidental Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC. 55 The EEOC sued an insurance
company that discriminated against an employee under Title VII. 56 It filed suit
more than three years after the employee filed a complaint with the EEOC and
more than five months after conciliation efforts between the parties ended. 57 The
issue before the court was whether a state statute of limitation could be invoked
to limit the amount of time the EEOC had to bring forth a claim. 58
The Court held that there is not a mandatory 180-day limit upon the EEOC to
bring forth a Title VII suit. 59 Rather, the Court determined the statute allows an
initiating party whose claim has not been dismissed, settled, or litigated by the
EEOC to bring forth a lawsuit after the 180 days. 60 Within this holding, the
Court determined that state statute of limitations cannot be used to limit the time
50. Id. at 268.
51. Id. at 282–83.
52. Id. at 283.
53. Id. at 281, 284.
54. Id. at 281–84.
55. 432 U.S. 355, 355–57 (1977). See Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d
789, 798 (4th Cir. 2001) (“ Consequently, when considering the timeliness of a cause of action
brought pursuant to a statute for which Congress has provided a limitations period, a court should
not apply laches to overrule the legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit t o apply for
actions brought under the statute.”). But see Guar. T r. Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 132–33
(1938) (stating “ [t]he rule that the sovereign is exempt from the consequences of its laches, and
from the operation of [federal] statutes of limitations . . .” survives on the ground of public policy
rather than of royal prerogative and is “ deemed . . . an exception to local statutes of limitations
where the government . . . is not expressly included . . . .”).
56. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 358.
57. Id. at 357–58.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 361.
60. Id.
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that the EEOC may take to bring an enforcement action, nor is there any time
limit the EEOC must follow. 61 Such a limitation would hinder the policy that
requires Title VII claims to be both investigated and potentially resolved by the
EEOC before litigation, and also would contradict congressional intent. 62
The Court determined that defendants would not be subjected to unfairness or
prejudice by an “artificial” limitation period, 63 reasoning that:
The absence of inflexible time limitations on bringing of lawsuits will
not, as the [defendant] asserts, deprive defendants in Title VII civil
actions of fundamental fairness or subject them to surprise and
prejudice that can result from the prosecution of stale claims . . .
[However,] when a Title VII defendant is in fact prejudiced by a
private plaintiff’s unexcused conduct of a particular case, the trial
court may restrict or even deny back pay relief. The same
discretionary power “to locate []a just result’s in light of the
circumstances peculiar to the case,” can also be exercised when the
EEOC is the plaintiff. 64
In United States v. Administrative Enterprises, Inc., 65 Judge Posner laid out
several possible solutions to the use of laches against the government. 66 One
solution was to limit its use to suits that protected a private, rather than a public
right. 67 Posner previously toyed with this idea in Martin v. Consultants &
Administrators, Inc. 68 Martin represents a scenario where a federal agency
(Department of Labor) may protect both private and public rights, but the dispute
at issue does not affect the agency’s sovereignty (individual fund claims), and
must be analyzed as if the claim involved private litigants. 69 Specifically, the
trustees of a health and welfare fund argued that the DOL’s suit against them
regarding the “viability of certain claims” for specific individuals’ retirement
accounts were barred by laches. 70 The trustees cited Occidental Life Insurance
Co. to show that courts have loosened the laches rule in regard to the EEOC
when litigating on behalf of an individual’s rights. 71 The trustees analogized this
argument to individual funded claims, rather than government funded claims
within its own fund. 72
61. Id. at 368–69.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 364.
64. Id. at 372–73.
65. 46 F.3d 670 (7th Cir. 1995).
66. Id. at 672–73; see United States v. Mack, 295 U.S. 480, 489 (1935) (“ Laches within the
term of the statute of limitations is no defense at law.”).
67. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d at 673.
68. 966 F.2d 1078, 1100–01 (7th Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 1100.
70. Id. at 1082–83.
71. Id. at 1090.
72. Id.
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The trustees argued, and the court agreed, that the lawsuit affected the
employees’ private rights because the dispute rested within individual employee
funds. 73 As Judge Posner stated:
In an ERISA suit . . . the invoking of laches to bar the government’s
suit would not take money out of the U.S. Treasury or interfere with
the government’s operations. It would not even deprive the
government of a financial expectancy. Any money it won in this case
would be paid into the pension plans against which the defendants
committed a breach of trust. 74
Although courts and judicial leaders continue to wrestle with the EEOC’s
balance between public and private rights, the Supreme Court last tackled the
issue in-depth in the 2002 ruling of EEOC v. Waffle House. 75 Here, the EEOC
filed suit for victim-specific relief under the Americans with Disabilities Act,
which receives its enforcement procedures from Title VII when enforcing
employment discrimination. 76 The Court reviewed whether the EEOC could
pursue victim-specific relief from an employer after the charging employee
signed an arbitration agreement with the employer. 77
The Court recognized the changes of enforcement power from the
aforementioned 1991 amendments to the statute. 78 The Court disagreed with the
lower court’s view that only when the EEOC seeks “broad” relief does the
“public interest” overcome private interest goals. 79 Rather, the Court held that

73. Id.
74. Id. at 1101.
75. 534 U.S. 279, 284–85 (2002).
76. Id. at 282; 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012).
T he powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of this title shall be the powers, remedies, and procedures this
subchapter provides to the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person
alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any provision of this
chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 12116 of this title, concerning
employment.
Id.; see BANNING , supra note 41, at 229 (“ It is an accepted maxim of equity, that delay defeats
equitable rights (5); and even a comparatively short delay, which is not satisfactory accounted for,
tells heavily against a plaintiff . . . .”).
77. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 282.
78. Id. at 287. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1).
In an action brought by a complaining party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000e-5, 2000e-16] against a respondent who engaged in
unlawful intentional discrimination (not an employment practice that is unlawful because
of its disparate impact) prohibited under section 703, 704, or 717 of the Act [42 U.S.C.
2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-16], and provided that the complaining party cannot recover
under section 1981 of this title, the complaining party may recover compensatory and
punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief
authorized by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent.
Id.
79. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290.
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the EEOC’s strong policy enforcement considerations do not limit the remedies
available to the EEOC. 80 The validity of the EEOC’s claims for such remedies,
or the type of relief sought when such private agreements are signed, remains an
open issue. 81
III. T HE REVIEW OF LACHES AND IT S EFFECT ON T HE RELAT IONSHIP BET WEEN
T HE EEOC, PRIVAT E EMPLOYEES, AND PRIVAT E EMPLOYERS FOLLOWS
CURRENT J UDICIAL CONCERNS
A. Higher Court Action Demonstrates Laches’ Timeliness in Federal Cases
Minimal guidance can be found in other areas of law with respect to EEOCinitiated Title VII cases. 82 In SCA Hygiene Products Aktiebolag v. First Quality
Baby Products, LLC, the Supreme Court reviewed the extent to which laches
can be used in patent infringement cases and how that may affect ongoing relief,
such as damages. 83 The Court held that laches cannot be an affirmative defense
under the Patent Act’s six-year limitations period. 84 Unlike Title VII claims,
Congress codified limitations periods within the patent statutes, and therefore
parties to these cases do not face the same uncertainty as the EEOC and private
employers with respect to laches. 85
A more appropriate analogy may be found in the United States’
denaturalization caseload. Similar to Title VII claims, there is no statute of
limitations when litigating denaturalization cases. The Ninth Circuit recently
addressed the issue in this context in United States v. Arango. 86 Fernando
Arango, a fraudulent green card holder, argued that the United States knew about
his involvement in a green card marriage fraud conspiracy, yet waited twenty
years until filing suit against him. 87 The Ninth Circuit did not affirmatively
address the issue of laches because Arango failed to prove “lack of diligence by
80. Id. at 292–93. But see id. at 298 (T homas, J., dissenting) (“ Absent explicit statutory
authorization . . . I cannot agree that the EEOC may do on behalf of an employee that which an
employee has agreed not to do for himself.”).
81. Id. at 297 (“ It is an open question whether a settlement or arbitration judgement would
affect the validity of the EEOC[] . . . .”).
82. See generally SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, v. First Quality Baby Prods., LLC, 137 S.
Ct. 954, 959 (2017); United States v. Arango, 686 F. App’x. 489, 491 (9th Cir. 2017).
83. SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag, 137 S. Ct. at 965–66.
84. Id. at 967. T he Court considered the following question: “ Whether and to what extent the
defense of laches may bar a claim for patent infringement brought within the Patent Act ’s six-year
statutory limitations period, 35 U.S.C. § 286.” Dennis Crouch, Supreme Court to Review (and
likely Reject) Laches as a Defense in Patent Infringement Cases, P ATENTLY O (May 2, 2016),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/05/supreme-defense-infringement.html.
85. See 35 U.S.C. § 286 (2012) (“ Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery shall be
had for any infringement committed more than six years prior to the filing of the complaint or
counterclaim for infringement in the action.”).
86. 686 F. App’x 489, 490 (9th Cir. 2017).
87. Brief for Appellee at 7, United States v. Arango, No. 10 -15821, 2010 WL 6753360 (9th
Cir. Dec. 29, 2010).
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the government” at the trial court. 88 Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit held in
United States v. Mandcyz that laches may not be used in denaturalization cases
“[b]ecause the United States act[s] in its sovereign capacity when it [seeks] to
denaturalize [a plaintiff] . . . .”89 Unlike Title VII cases, where an administrative
agency holds enforcement power, there is little question that the United States is
acting as the sovereign when it denaturalizes an individual.
Occidental Life Insurance Co. remains the key case for analysis purposes.
Unfortunately, for guidance sake, the question presented before the Court in
Occidental Life Insurance Co. did not address a laches defense, unlike
Costello. 90 Without a firm ruling on laches in employment discrimination cases,
the aforementioned cases only add to the analysis, rather than provide a clearcut answer, to the availability of laches an employer may possess for Title VII
relief in the EEOC context. This lack of guidance leaves plaintiffs and
defendants with mid-twentieth century case law pitted against late twentieth and
early twenty-first century employment scenarios.
B. Employers Should Use Costello Evidentiary Deficiencies Against Ongoing
Relief
Generally, disagreements over laches use begin when an individual timely
files a complaint with the EEOC and chooses to wait for the EEOC to finalize
its administrative processes, or decides to delay suit past the minimum 180-day
waiting period. 91 More often than not, the reason for delay in these cases is the
EEOC’s claim backlog. 92
Employers who are defending stale claims often wrestle with the same
evidentiary deficiencies analyzed in Costello that accompany the passage of
time, such as documents destroyed in the ordinary course of business or
unavailability of witnesses that naturally arises from employee turnover. 93
Private individuals defending delay on EEOC backlog grounds tend to be
successful when they are able to prove that the EEOC was active during the
administrative waiting game, rather than dormant or rendering “dilatory
tactics.”94 “Mere passage of time” is not an indicator, but case law shows that
under these fact patterns, suits filed even eight years after the initial complaint

88. Arango, 686 F. App’x. at 490; e.g., United States v. Dang, 488 F.3d 1135, 1143–44 (9th
Cir. 2007) (“ It remains an open question in this circuit as to whether laches is a permissible defense
to a denaturalization proceeding.”).
89. United States v. Mandycz, 447 F.3d 951, 964 (6th Cir. 2006).
90. Compare Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 357 (1977) with Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281–82 (1961).
91. Kobylak, supra note 8, §§ 4–5.
92. Id. §§ 4, 6.
93. Id. § 3c.
94. Eric Matusewitch, If You Snooze You May Lose: Courts Are Ruling on Laches Defense,
12 NO . 16 ANDRES EMP ’ T LITIG . REP . 3 (1998); Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3c.

Fall 2018]

Is a Delayed Result a Just Result?

799

can be considered reasonable. 95 When cases of dormancy or “dilatory tactics”
are proven, however, employers generally have been able to show prejudice due
to the delay because of lack of witnesses and destroyed records due to in-place
record retention policies. 96 EEOC-initiated cases have found similar arguments,
but less determinative outcomes. 97
C. The EEOC Must Continue to Rely on Occidental Life Insurance Co. for a
Sound Sovereign Defense
In addition to Costello, district and appellate courts continually use the
guiding principle from Occidental Life Insurance Co. when deciding laches use
against the EEOC in EEOC-initiated cases, despite the Court in Occidental Life
Insurance Co. not definitely handling a laches argument. 98 When analyzed
against Costello, these rulings provide a narrow window to interject a laches
defense without sovereign immunity questions. 99 Courts have permitted the use
of laches against the EEOC despite potentially “protecting a public right” under
these fact patterns. However, none have set a threshold that must be met in order
to properly establish a laches defense against the EEOC. 100
Ultimately, the EEOC still functions as an arm of the United States
government, and carries the presumption of sovereign rule; an employer’s
defense must jump over this hurdle. As long as there are few Costello
deficiencies, the EEOC should be able to protect its ability to reasonably pursue
back pay for the public good.
IV. HOW

A FAILED LACHES

DEFENSE CAN INCREASE
PAY LIABILIT Y

AN

EMPLOYER’S BACK

One of the more daunting prejudicial factors faced by an employer due to a
prolonged delay is increased monetary liability. 101 Back pay is the total lost
earnings an employee incurs, including, but not limited to, “compensation or
salary, overtime, premium pay and shift differentials, incentive pay, raises
bonuses, lost sales commissions, cost-of-living increases, tips, medical and life
insurance, fringe benefits, and pensions, stock awards and options.”102 The
EEOC can pursue back pay under the “Make Whole Relief” doctrine, as
95. Kobylak, supra note 8, §§ 3a, 3d, 6.
96. Id. § 3c.
97. Id. § 3d.
98. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 360 (1977); see, e.g., EEOC v. UPS, No.
15-CV-4141, 2017 WL 2829513, at *31 (E.D.N.Y. June 29, 2017) (discussing how some courts
might have found exceptions to the laches rule under Occidental and T itle VII).
99. Compare Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281 (1961) with Occidental Life Ins.
Co., 432 U.S. at 374 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
100. Kobylak, supra note 8, § 5.
101. Id. §§ 3b, 3d.
102. U.S. Department of Labor DIR 2013-04, DEP ’ T OF LABOR 2 (July 17, 2013), https://ww
w.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compliance/directives/dir310.pdf.
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characterized by the Department of Labor, for both victim-specific relief
(Individual Relief) as well as class-wide relief without facing the class action
requirements under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 103 A
remedy under the “Make Whole Relief” doctrine restores a victim or victims to
the position that they would have occupied if the discrimination did not take
place. 104 Generally, the EEOC can pursue back pay with interest under this
approach. 105 Back pay is within the equitable discretion of the court, and, while
it may not result in a finding of material prejudice, that “does not eliminate the
availability of the laches defense” based on the totality of prejudicial
circumstances. 106
The EEOC’s discretion allows it to work for the collective workers’ interests
(i.e., the public interest) in regards to a particular discrimination charge. 107
Although this enforcement of a public right could close the door on an
employer’s laches defense outright, courts have found more difficulty in a clear
response. 108 The narrower focus of laches’ use against prejudicial back pay
renders limited, yet beneficial, advice for employers when facing a grow ing
number of individuals that the EEOC could assert a lawsuit on behalf of over an
undetermined number of years. 109 Prejudice must be confined to the
discriminatory allegation at hand, generalized prejudice may still occur despite
documentary hurdles, but that is not enough for the remedy. 110

103. EEOC v. SMWM Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543, at *19
(D. Ariz. April 21, 2009); Gen. T el. Co. of the Nw., Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 326 (1980) (“When
the EEOC acts, albeit at the behest of and for the benefit of specific individuals, it acts also to
vindicate the public interest in preventing employment discrimination.”).
104. U.S. Department of Labor DIR 2013-04, supra note 102, at 3.
105. Id.
106. Kobylak, supra note 8, § 2[a]; Smith v. Caterpillar, Inc., 358 F.3d 730, 735 (7th Cir.
2003).
107. See United States v. R.I. Dep’t of Corr., 81 F. Supp. 3d 182, 185 (D.R.I. 2015):
[W]hen a T itle VII defendant is in fact prejudiced by a private plaintiff ’s unexcused
conduct of a particular case, the trial court may restrict or even deny [back pay] relief . .
. . T he same discretionary power to locate a just result in light of the circumstances
peculiar to the case, can also be exercised when the EEOC is the plaintiff.
Id. at 192 n.12.; BANNING , supra note 41, at 229 (“It is an accepted maxim of equity, t hat delay
defeats equitable rights (5); and even a comparatively short delay, which is not satisfactory
accounted for, tells heavily against a plaintiff . . . .”).
108. See e.g., EEOC v. Alioto Fish Co., 623 F.2d 86, 88–89 (9th Cir. 1980).
109. E.g., EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 696 F. Supp. 1438, 1440 –41 (M.D. Fl. 1988)
(“ Because of [the EEOC’s] representative role, the defense of laches is sometimes available against
[it,] although laches is not available against the United States when it is acting in its sovereign
capacity to enforce a public right or protect a public interest.”); EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 258 F.
Supp. 2d 822, 824–26 (W.D. T enn. 2003). T he court decided not to limit back pay to 300 days
before the filing of the discrimination charge. Autozone, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 832.
110. See 30A C.J.S. Equity § 4 (2018).
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A. There is No Definitive Threshold for Undue Delay
The substantive reasons for a particular delay on behalf of the EEOC have
found more traction for establishing the unreasonable delay prong than the
length of time between action and filing, specifically during the conciliation and
investigatory pre-lawsuit phases. 111 Substantive backlog issues and lengthy
delay tend to persuade courts to find for this first prong. 112 District Courts
continue to split on the issue of whether a delay is substantive enough, with
minimal Circuit Court guidance.
A lawsuit initiated five years after alleged discrimination may dangle between
a finding for or against unreasonable delay. 113 In EEOC v. Jacksonville
Shipyards, Inc., 114 the court found a five-year delay between alleged
discrimination and lawsuit initiation excusable because the EEOC deferred the
case to a separate agency to conduct an audit. 115 The court refused to find
unreasonable delay because the claim remained active, even though audit
deferment may not be the type of movement an employer considers
reasonable. 116 Alternatively, in EEOC v. Autozone, 117 more than a five-year
delay between the EEOC initial claim and lawsuit filing occurred. Here, the
actual duration between alleged action and lawsuit tipped the court in favor of
the defendant. 118 The court reviewed the case as three separate time periods with
three separate delay assessments. 119 The first segment, a two-and-half year
period, consisted of the EEOC’s review of the applicant material and on-site
inspections. 120 The second segment, less than one year, consisted of two
separate settlement conferences. 121 Neither of these two periods exerted the
unreasonable delay needed for laches. 122 The third segment of the five-year
period, which lasted less than two years, represented the most viable area where
unfair delay may be imposed because conciliation efforts ended between the
parties. 123 The court found in favor of unreasonable delay during this period
because the EEOC neither presented a substantive backlog argument nor cited
separate agency review of the documents. 124

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

See generally 30A C.J.S. Equity § 145 (2018).
E.g., Autozone, 258 F. Supp. 2d at 826.
Kobylak, supra note 8, § 3[c].
696 F. Supp. 1438 (M.D. Fl. 1988).
Id. at 1440.
Id.
258 F. Supp. 2d 822 (W.D. T enn. 2003).
Id. at 826–27.
Id. at 827.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The actual duration between events corresponds to an individual’s back pay
calculation. 125 Even when narrowly reviewing the right to back pay, courts tend
to require more than mere durational accounts of general prejudice. 126 In EEOC
v. Alioto Fish Ltd., 127 the Ninth Circuit found that an administrative delay that
caused a sixty-two month delay between charge filing and lawsuit filing
naturally caused “substantial[] prejudice[] [to Alioto] in its defense of claims for
back pay.”128 Similarly, one court granted summary judgment to the employer
in EEOC v. Peterson, Howell, & Heather, Inc. 129 after a sixty-three month delay
during the investigatory and conciliation stages. 130 The court reasoned:
During . . . administrative delays, the back pay meter has been running,
thus exposing the defendants to greater pecuniary losses . . . [T]he
EEOC has dealt defendants [with] a double-fisted blow. The passage
of time has hindered the defendants in their ability to prevail on the
merits while at the same time inflating the potential damages
defendants face if they do not prevail. 131
The undue delay required for laches should also stem from the EEOC itself,
not any extraneous entities. In one of the few guiding Circuit Court decisions,
the Fourth Circuit found that the trial court in EEOC v. Navy Federal Credit
Union abused its discretion when it found in favor of the employer due to a fouryear delay during the EEOC’s investigatory phase of a Title VII retaliation
claim. 132 The EEOC cited the delay due to a “lack of diligence” by an
independent agency charged with specific investigatory tasks. 133 The defendant
argued that the EEOC and the separate entity formed an agency relationship,
placing liability on the EEOC. 134 Rather, the Fourth Circuit held that the
autonomous relationship between the two agencies cannot surmount to the type
of undue delay required for laches against the EEOC. 135 In this scenario, the
EEOC cannot be responsible for an independent agency’s idleness.
Occidental Life Insurance Co. permitted judicial discretion between
unreasonable and reasonable delay in order to provide a “just result.” 136 As the
arm of the sovereign, the EEOC rightly has the power to enforce Title VII,

125. U.S. Department of Labor DIR 2013-04, supra note 102, at 2.
126. See generally infra notes 127–135.
127. 623 F.2d 86 (9th Cir. 1980).
128. Id. at 88–89.
129. 702 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Md. 1989).
130. Id. at 1221, 1228.
131. Id. at 1224.
132. EEOC v. Navy Fed. Credit Union, 424 F.3d 397, 411 (4th Cir. 2005).
133. Id. at 409.
134. Id. at 409–10. In discussing the differences between the two agencies, the Fourth Circuit
discussed how “ deferral agencies” under T itle VII “ operate with substantial independence” despite
potentially sharing “ primary responsibility to enforce the civil rights laws.” Id.
135. Id. at 411.
136. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977).
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despite a vague balancing act between unreasonable and reasonable delay.137
The “double fisted blow” back pay relief can cause when assessing laches
availability likely falls under Occidental Life Insurance Co.’s intent when
allowing judicial discretion. 138 So long as the facts satisfy laches’ material
prejudice prong, Occidental Life Insurance Co. leaves room to allow a “just
result” that neither steps on the EEOC’s jurisdiction nor hinders an employer’s
ability to fairly defend against an unreasonable back pay calculation. 139
B. When Courts Refuse to Address Back Pay “Head On” Without Discovery
When concrete examples of material prejudice are unavailable, employers
may find more difficulty in obtaining what may be seen as a “just result” in
limiting back pay through laches. 140 In EEOC v. SWMW Management, 141 the
defendant argued that undue delay occurred throughout the EEOC’s
investigatory and conciliation effort stages, ultimately causing “unfair[]
accentuated potential monetary damages.”142 The employer cited difficulty in
locating key witnesses, corporate structure changes, and high turnover of
employees, including those employees in charge of record retention policies.143
However, the employer did not establish a firm link between these factors and
any actual prejudice as the court found these conditions existed before the filing
of the discrimination charge. 144 The court did not address the back pay issue
head on, despite being one of the defendant’s main arguments, because neither
side presented substantial evidence for the court to resolve the matter. 145
Similarly, the court in EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc. 146 found the employer’s
concern about monetary liability “premature” as neither party had yet conducted
discovery. 147
The employer had cited specific examples of witness
unavailability after a six-year delay. 148 However, because PBM Graphics could
not discuss exactly what evidence was needed from the witnesses, or why
affidavits from other employees were not sufficient, the court could not balance
potential prejudicial factors against the apparent delay due to EEOC backlog. 149
Only two of the twelve employees at issue remained with the company. 150 The
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2012); see also Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 360.
See Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. 355 at 373.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a).
Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. 355 at 360.
No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543 (D. Ariz. April 22, 2009).
Id. at *14 n.2.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *11.
Id. at *21.
877 F. Supp. 2d 334 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
Id. at 367.
Id. at 364.
Id. at 367.
Id. at 365.
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court agreed that the employer was prejudiced, just not exactly how it had been
prejudiced. 151
Courts came to similar conclusions in EEOC v. Lockheed Martin Global
Telecommunications, Inc. 152 and EEOC v. Jetstream Ground Services, Inc. 153
Although the court found that back pay could arguably be “the most prejudicial
aspect” of the EEOC’s delay in Lockheed Martin Global Telecommunications,
the court ordered discovery to allow the EEOC to develop its case theory more
thoroughly. 154 Back pay may have been prejudicial to Jetstream Ground
Services, Inc., but the employer pointed to no other authority “which indicates
that this factor alone suffices to show prejudice . . . .”155 Ultimately, an employer
cannot rest on duration alone in order to effectively meet the burden of
unreasonable delay against the EEOC. 156 An employer must specifically define
the type of prejudice exerted by the delay, otherwise broad prejudice will not
suffice. 157
C. Record Retention Polices and Faded Memories are Not Enough to Limit
Back Pay
One of the biggest effects of laches against employees is the effect of delay
on an employer’s routine, record retention policies, and unavailability of
witnesses. 158 Employers generally do not keep records past a certain time period
due to both procedure and storage constraints. The EEOC requires employers
to retain personnel and employment records for at least one year, including
records for terminated employees. 159
In industries with excessive turnover, such as transportation, packaging, and
shipping services, a delay of even one year may render prejudice. 160 Because
“mere passage of time” is not a threshold, courts continue to question how undue

151. Id. at 367–68.
152. 514 F. Supp. 2d 797 (D. Md. 2007).
153. 134 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (D. Colo. 2015).
154. Lockheed Martin Glob. Telecomm., 514 F. Supp. 2d at 805; see EEOC v. Am. Nat ’l Bank,
574 F.2d 1173, 1176 (4th Cir. 1978) (Back pay must be “ considered after the facts have been fully
developed, if the commission ultimately prevails.”).
155. JetStream , 134 F. Supp. 3d at 1333 (“ [B]ecause backpay is an equitable remedy and
subject to mitigation, the Court has the discretion to take the EEOC’s delay into account when
fashioning a remedy.”).
156. See Kelly, supra note 2, at 228, 230–31.
157. Id. at 228–30.
158. See EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F.2d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 1982) ( “ Perhaps the
greatest disagreement between the parties concerns the loss of records.”).
159. Recordkeeping Requirements, U.S. EQUAL EMP ’ T OP P ORTUNITY COMM’ N , ht
tps://www.eeoc.gov/employers/recordkeeping.cfm (last visited Mar. 14, 2018) (“ Regulations
require that employees keep all personnel or employment records for one year. If an employer is
involuntarily terminated, his/her personnel records must be retained for one year from date of
termination.”).
160. E.g., Dresser Indus., Inc., 668, F.2d at 1204.
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delay may factor into employer fairness, ultimately affecting litigation fairness
for both employer and employee. 161 The need for witnesses must be narrowly
confined to the discriminatory allegation at hand. Prejudice may still occur
despite these various hurdles, but general prejudice is not enough for an
equitable remedy. 162
A telling example where an employer provided specific examples of witness
availability as a prejudicial factor occurred in EEOC v. Dresser Industries,
Inc. 163 In Dresser, the employer provided affidavits demonstrating the
unavailability of witnesses. 164 Both the manager of quality control and
inspection supervisor died during the pendency of litigation, and the employer
last heard of the plant manager leaving the country and heading to Libya.165
Because these three individuals possessed pertinent information no other
member of Dresser Industries could preserve, the court ruled in favor of the
employer. 166
Dresser also argued that, while it preserved documentation in regard to the
charging employee’s personnel records, it did not keep any additional records
past its internal five-year retention policy. 167 The court did not fault the
employer, determining that “[o]nce the [employer] satisf[ied] the EEOC’s record
retention requirement . . . they should not be punished for failing to exceed
standards mandated by the very Commission that promulgated them.”168
Alternatively, the court and an employer may differ on how instrumental a
witness may be to a laches defense. The employer in PBM Graphics, Inc. cited
specific examples of witness unavailability after a six-year delay. 169 Of the
twelve employees at issue, only two remained with the company. 170 Of the
management officers, two had died. 171 Only one upper-management employee
remained with the company during the time period in question. 172 Because the
EEOC had not fully developed its case, which could shift the burden of proof

161. See EEOC v. Radiator Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979)
(“ [G]eneralized allegation[s] of harm from the passage of time does not amount to a showing of
prejudice.”).
162. Id.
163. 668 F.2d 1199, 1200 (11th Cir. 1982) (“The tortoise-like speed with which the [EEOC]
handled the enforcement action of this T itle VII case has cost it the race.”).
164. Id. at 1203.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1201.
167. Id. at 1204.
168. Id.
169. EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d 334, 365 –66 (M.D.N.C.
2012); see Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F. 2d at 1200–04.
170. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at 365.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 366.
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from the government to the employee, it was unclear how witness unavailability
specifically affected the employer. 173
PBM Graphics unfortunately relied on the Dresser employer’s more specific
witness need theory. 174 The question of discriminatory hiring and firing in
Dresser rested on an individual hiring manager’s actions and recollections. 175
PBM Graphics did not cite a specific need for any of the eight upper
management employees, only relying on the prejudice of time that left one
remaining management position employee available. 176 Although the court did
not decide on a threshold, it did call prejudice a “threshold issue” in
differentiating witness need from Dresser. 177
Evidence that no one at the company was present during the discriminatory
acts is also concrete evidence of prejudice, and a deceased employee inherently
causes testimony issues. 178 As analyzed by the court in EEOC v. Martin
Processing, Inc., two employees may be in charge of a charging party’s hiring
and alleged discriminatory firing, and if one is deceased, there are clearly
testimonial issues that may hinder an employer’s defense. 179 However, when
none of the current supervisors had any connection with the employment of the
charging employees, the employer cannot cite specific evidentiary prejudice.180
If an employer cites a deceased witness, but the deceased witness’s testimony is
neither crucial and can be “replaced” by crucial, living witnesses, the court w ill
rule against prejudice. 181
The Fourth Circuit faced the opportunity to calm confusion regarding witness
and record retention policies in EEOC v. Propak Logistics, Inc., 182 but left the
availability of the use of laches as an affirmative defense at the trial level. 183 The
EEOC initiated the lawsuit against Propak six and a half years after a former
employee filed a discrimination claim. 184 Specifically, the claim stated that
Propak discriminated against a class of non-Hispanic individuals at one of its
North Carolina facilities. 185 The district court ruled in favor of the defendant’s
motion for summary judgment, stating, “there were significant periods when the
EEOC took little or no action toward completing the investigation.” 186 The court

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 366–67.
Id. at 367–68.
Id.
Id. at 365–66.
Id. at 366–68.
E.g., EEOC v. Martin Processing, Inc., 533 F. Supp. 227, 230 –32 (W.D. Va. 1982).
Id. at 230–32.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 232–33.
746 F.3d 145, 147 (4th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 150.
Id. at 148.
Id.
Id. at 149.
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stated that the defendant experienced prejudice because certain key witnesses
were no longer available, and, if they were available, would encounter “faded
memories” of the events at question. 187
Additionally, personnel records had been destroyed in accordance with
Propak’s routine of destroying personnel files after a certain time. 188 The Fourth
Circuit ruled against the EEOC on procedural grounds, and did not discuss the
availability of the use of laches because the EEOC abandoned the argument
when it abandoned a prior summary judgment order. 189 The Fourth Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s ruling in favor of the defendant’s request for attorney
fees. 190 Under the clear error standard of review, the Fourth Circuit failed to
state the trial court clearly erred with regard to the laches argument. 191
D. Employers Cannot Depend on EEOC Backlog to Stop Back Pay Damages
from Accruing
An employer’s reality in minimizing the ticking back pay clock in pursuit of
a laches defense rests on the fact that the hybrid public and private rights the
EEOC asserts predominately rest in its sovereign foundation. 192 Defendants
cannot rely on the EEOC’s administrative delays, whether in the conciliation
process or even pre-litigation phase, to automatically halt back pay. 193 Neither
does an employer have firm case law to determine if a court will decide laches
on either public sovereign grounds or private grounds based on loose
thresholds. 194 Although there is minimal case law of laches use in light of Waffle
House’s holding, the issue Waffle House presents within “public” Title VII
enforcement leaves open the door to higher monetary damages with an unknown
judgment date. 195
When asserting a laches defense against the EEOC, the employer does not
know whether or not they are defending against a public or private entity. 196 An
employer can, however, follow two paths. First, an employer should analyze the
specific prejudicial factors as described above in determining if laches is the

187. Id.
188. Id. at 149–50.
189. Id. at 152–53.
190. Id. at 153.
191. Id.
192. EEOC v. Martin Processing, 533 F. Supp. 227, 229–30. (W.D. Va. 1982).
193. See e.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F.3d at 148; EEOC v. PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp.
2d 334, 365 (M.D.N.C. 2012); EEOC v. SWMW Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009
WL 1097543, *6–7 (D. Ariz. April 22, 2009).
194. See e.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F.3d at 151–52; PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at
368–69; SWMW Mgmt., Inc., 2009 WL 109753, at *14 n.2.
195. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295 –98 (2002) (finding that the EEOC acts
as more than just a “ proxy” when litigating on behalf of an employee).
196. United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46 F.3d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1995) .
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appropriate remedy. 197 The causal link between faded memories, lost witnesses,
and lost documents must strongly correlate to the present prejudice an employer
faces; a court will easily cut the cord to this defense if this does not exist. 198
More importantly, an employer cannot self-inflict prejudice. 199 Recordretention policies must be crafted in a way that both follows the EEOC’s
requirements, but that also accounts for inevitable litigation that any employer
could face, and the inevitable pre-litigation time period backlog may produce. 200
A subpoena could appear almost seven years after the initial EEOC filing,
initiating potential prejudice under the second prong of laches. 201
It is impractical for an employer to keep years upon years of employee
records, especially when it is more common for employees to sign arbitration
agreements that limit back pay of a private individual. 202 Although arbitration
agreements are not the focus of this Note, Waffle House’s open issue does affect,
for better or for worse, a laches defense. 203 Without clear-cut prejudicial
evidence, an employer should present its case against the EEOC as it would
against the United States litigating in its sovereign capacity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The judicial discretion of a “just result” a court may prescribe an employer
fails to rely on a guiding principle. 204 Whether the EEOC acts as an entity
protecting private rights or as the arm of the sovereign government in
discrimination cases remains to be decided by the courts. 205 Both employers and
employees remain in limbo and both are stuck relying on the judicial opinions
of past discrimination cases and constitutional scholars who abstractly debate an
entity’s sovereignty. The use of laches in this context, or other acts where
Congress imposes no statute of limitations, may easily be cemented by either

197. See e.g., EEOC v. Autozone, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 2d 822, 826 (W.D. T enn. 2003).
198. E.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F.3d at 149.
199. See PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at 363–64.
200. Cf. EEOC v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 668 F. 2d 1199, 1203 (11th Cir. 1982) ( “ Perhaps the
greatest disagreement between the parties concerns th e loss of records.”); Recordkeeping
Requirements, supra note 159 (“ Regulations require that employees keep all personnel or
employment records for one year. If an employer is involuntarily terminated, his/her personnel
records must be retained for one year from the date of termination.”).
201. E.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F.3d at 148–49; PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at 363–
64.
202. EEOC v. Waffle House, 534 U.S. 279, 282–83 (2002).
203. Id. at 296 n.10, 11.
204. Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 373 (1977).
205. See e.g., Propak Logistics, 746 F. 3d at 151–52; PBM Graphics, Inc., 877 F. Supp. 2d at
350–60; EEOC v. SWMW Mgmt., Inc., No. CV-08-0946-PHX-GMS, 2009 WL 1097543, *4–5
(D. Ariz. April 22, 2009).
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future judicial opinion or policy venture. 206 Until then, the EEOC must continue
to be wary of an employer’s back pay limiting weapon of laches. 207

206. Lyons P’ship, L.P. v. Morris Costumes, Inc., 243 F.3d 789, 798 (2001) (“ Consequently,
when considering the timeliness of a cause of action brought pursuant to a statute for which
Congress has provided a limitations period, a court should not apply laches to overrule the
legislature’s judgment as to the appropriate time limit to apply for actions brought under the
statute.”); see Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 382; United States v. Admin. Enters., Inc., 46
F.3d 670, 672–73 (7th Cir. 1995); Kelly, supra note 2, at 231–32; Kobylak, supra note 8, at § 3(a).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1), (d)(1)(A) (2012); Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290; Time
Limits for Filing A Charge, supra note 11.
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